"Self-temporalization through depresentation, so to speak (through recollection), has its analogue in my self-alienation (empathy as a depresentation of a higher of a higher level - depresentation of my primal presence into merely presentified primal presence). Thus, in me, 'another I' achieves ontic validity as co-present with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which are obviously quite different from those of a 'sense'-perception."
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 185.
"This idea is that the self in recollection has to unify itself with the earlier recollected self... two main implications. On the one hand, it is, for Husserl, the primal ego which in its self-temporalizing constitutes the full, transcendental ego. Secondly, this self-temporalization of the ego allows the ego to posit variations of itself, and this plays a role in the constitution of other egos."
Dermot Moran, Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 255.
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