Husserl and Transcendental Philosophy

"Natural human understanding and the objectivism rooted in it will view every transcendental philosophy as a flighty eccentricity, its wisdom as useless foolishness; or it will interpret it as a psychology which seeks to convince itself that it is not a psychology." (Husserl, C 200)

"Husserl considers the domain of transcendental subjectivity not just to be a set of formal conditions for knowledge (as in Kant), categorical frameworks and formal rules for organizing experience, but to be a domain of life, of living, of genuine experience, a domain that has never before been examined in philosophy... The transcendental domain is a domain of conscious experiences, albeit a domain of experience which cannot be entered from the natural attitude." (Moran, p. 219)

"The life-world in which we live 'naively' will be, under the transcendental epoche, transformed into a 'transcendental phenomenon' (C 174)"

Dermont Moran, Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 221.

"it is not the being of the world as unquestioned, taken for granted, which is primary in itself... rather what is primary in itself is subjectivity, understood as that which naively pregives the being of the world and then rationalizes or (what is the same thing) objectifies it" (Husserl, C 69).

Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970).