Tuesday, September 19, 2017

Husserl on a Thing's relation to Circumstances

Exhibition of the Materiality of the thing by way of its Dependence on Circumstances

"What is real of the thing itself is as multiple as it has, in this sense, real properties, ones which are, throughout, unities with respect to manifolds of schematic regulations in relation to corresponding circumstances."

Edmund Husserl, Ideas II (Norwell, MA: Kulwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 46.

The Schema as Real Determinateness of the Material Thing

"There are as many directions of unity prefigured in the causal apprehension of the schema (i.e., directions for possible series of perceptions in functional relation to series of perceptible circumstances) as there is multiplicity in the way in which the reality-thing, the unitary material 'substance,' is determinable according to properties corresponding to the apprehended sense itself."

Ibid, p. 47.

Property Changes

"For all property-changes we have corresponding changes in the circumstances. In all its modes of behavior the thing is dependent on circumstances, and it is in relation to circumstances that the thing is what it is."

Ibid, p. 51.

Apprehension and Perception

"Every apprehension of a thing takes place in the midst of a co-apprehension of circumstances as conditioning. But the thing never achieves perfect givenness.... That is, perception is not an experience which provides a full report about the thing. What arises for reflection thereby is that we have to distinguish, regarding a thing, between external and internal circumstances, between externally caused and internally caused changes, processes, etc."

Ibid, p. 54.

Nature of a Thing

"a thing is in itself really [reell] composed if it is an aggregate of things which stand in certain relations of reciprocal action and, to be precise, in such a way that, over against external causalities, they exhibit a unity of lawful relations and have a total state which leads back to the element's singular states, ones ruled by laws, and which do so, in general, in such wise that the 'totality' behaves formaliter like a thing, with reference to certain encompassing classes of 'circumstances.'"

Ibid, p. 55.